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the	attempt	to	unlock	the	fundamental	physics	of	the	universe.3	More	than	ten	thousand	researchers,	engineers,	and	students	from	sixty	countries	on	six	continents	contribute	to	the	LHC's	six	standing	projects.	At	the	core	of	this	instrument	are	detectors,	such	as	calorimeters	and	muon	spectrometers,	that	record	with	incredible	precision	what	happens	when	particles	smash	together	at	fantastic	speeds.	These	detectors	record,	process,	and	store,	600	million	events	per	second,	and	along	with	other	instruments	at	the	Centre	for	Nuclear	Research	(CERN),	produce	70	petaflops	of	data	annually.4	Far	away	in	Chile,	the	Atacama	Desert	is	home	to	another	large	group	of	instruments,	where	scientists	observe,	via	an	array	of	over	fifty	mobile	telescopes,	millimeter	and	submillimeter	wavelengths	that	are	theoretically	capable	of	providing	insight	on	star	births	at	the	beginning	of	the	universe,	along	with	detailed	imaging	of	local	star	and	planet	formations.	The	Atacama	Large	Millimetre	Array	(ALMA)	relies	on	a	robust	supercomputer	to	convert	the	data	it	collects	into	more	manageable	digital	information.	Even	tracking	the	migrations	of	fish	in	a	controlled	lake	at	the	Experimental	Lakes	Area	(ELA)	far	to	the	north	in	Kenora,	Ontario,	requires	sophisticated	GPS	tracking	technology,	as	well	as	software	to	compile	coherent	data	for	scientists	to	further	their	investigations.	With	such	sophisticated	instruments	at	work,	clearly	it	is	not	a	matter	of	whether	technology	has	been	used	to	discover	new	scientific	knowledge,	but	rather	to	what	extent	it	has	been	used	to	do	so	and	what	influence	it	has	on	generating	this	new	knowledge.			Many	investigators	and	theorists	consider	the	roles	that	such	a	variety	of	scientific	instruments	play	within	the	production	and	dissemination	of	new	knowledge.	Bruno	Latour,	for	example,	applies	a	sociological	perspective	to	what	is	actually	being	produced	in	the	scientific	laboratory:			 “[P]articular	 significance	 can	 be	 attached	 to	 the	 operation	 of	apparatus	which	provides	some	kind	of	written	output.	Of	 course,	there	are	various	items	of	apparatus	in	the	laboratory	which	do	not	have	this	function.	Such	"machines"	transform	matter	between	one	
                                               
3  "Budget overview: Media and Press Relations,” CERN: Accelerating Science, accessed February 03, 2017, 
https://press.cern/facts-and-figures/budget-overview. 
4  "Computing," CERN: Accelerating Science, accessed February 3, 2017,  
https://home.cern/about/computing. 
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state	and	another.	[F]or	example…a	rotary	evaporator,	a	centrifuge,	a	 shaker,	 and	 a	 grinder.	 By	 contrast,	 a	 number	 of	 other	 items	 of	apparatus,	which	we	shall	call	"inscription	devices,"	transform	pieces	of	matter	into	written	documents.	More	exactly,	an	inscription	device	is	 any	 item	of	 apparatus	or	 particular	 configuration	 of	 such	 items	which	can	transform	a	material	substance	into	a	figure	or	diagram	which	is	directly	usable	by	one	of	the	members	of	the	office	space.5			Latour’s	description	relies	on	interpreting	the	scientist’s	collaboration	with	“inscription	devices,”	which	can	be	described	as	recording	instruments	designed	for	the	specific	purpose	of	measuring	some	phenomenon	or	occurrence	in	the	laboratory,	and	must	be	accurate	and	consistent	in	their	measurements	over	time.	Thus,	inscription	machines	mediate	between	scientist	and	subject,	and	have	become	increasingly	necessary	as	the	inquiries	scientists	perform	have	become	progressively	more	complex	and	abstract.6	The	observance	of	most,	if	not	all,	phenomena	in	science	today,	depends	entirely	on	inscription	machines	of	various	sorts	to	confirm	findings.	From	the	many	detectors	attached	to	the	aforementioned	LHC,	to	an	ageing	scale	tucked	away	in	a	high	school	biology	lab,	tools	are	needed	for	observers	to	reference,	confirm,	and	attribute	their	claims.	Once	an	experiment	is	established,	the	observer	must	wait	for	an	instrument	to	reveal	tangible	data	that	can	then	be	recorded	in	some	visual	mode,	which	can	then	be	stored	on	another	device,	typically	a	computer.	Since	few	experiments	would	be	considered	sound	with	only	one	sampling	of	data,	instruments	must	be	utilized	multiple	times	to	ensure	the	credibility	of	both	the	technology	and	the	consistency	of	its	output,	and	only	then	might	this	data	be	offered	as	evidence	of	some	phenomenon.	Confirmation,	or	the	construction	of	a	fact,	in	Latour’s	accounting,	is	therefore	entirely	social,	only	occurring	after	others	with	expertise	have	begun	referencing	without	question	to	claims	brought	forth	via	repeatable	experimentation.7			
                                               
5 Bruno Latour, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), 71. 
6 This statement refers to management of increasing quantities of data through instruments capable of 
producing more calculations and inscriptions, and the assumption that with every increase in computing 
power and refinement of past instruments, more data can be gathered and analyzed faster than ever.   
7 Latour, Laboratory Life: 71. 
 4 
	 As	will	be	highlighted	throughout	this	thesis,	there	are	many	resemblances	linking	various	detectors	in	science	to	those	of	the	artist’s	camera.	If	we	define	the	camera	as	a	technological	instrument	that	captures	some	physical	phenomenon	occurring	in	space	and	time,	encoding	and	then	translating	it	to	another	medium,	the	conceptual	difference	from,	for	example,	a	detector	measuring	the	energy	of	atoms,	becomes	one	of	form	rather	than	of	generic	function.	While	not	all	detectors	and	instruments	used	in	science	share	an	obvious	similarity	to	the	photographic	camera	(say	the	computer,	for	instance),	the	introduction	of	digital	photography	and	its	current	reliance	on	electronic	computation	diminish	this	gap.	Such	similarities	do	not	end	here,	however.	Latour	writes,	“[a]n	important	consequence	of	this	notion	of	inscription	device	is	that	inscriptions	are	regarded	as	having	a	direct	relationship	to	the	original	substance.”8	This	notion	of	“direct	relationship”	applies	equally	to	scientific	instruments	and	the	photographic	camera	via	their	indexicality;	that	is,	both	have	a	startling	capacity	to	embody	what	we	have	come	to	regard	as	“facts”	or	some	form	of	indisputable	facticity.		However,	the	outputs	of	inscription	devices	are	but	“presentations	of	reality	as	configured	or	coded	or	written,”	as	Rosalind	Krauss	suggests	upon	reflecting	on	the	photographic	image.9	Indeed,	examining	scientific	instruments	through	the	lens	of	photographic	and	artistic	practice	(and	vice-versa)	can	produce	a	unique	perspective	on	the	malleability	of	the	“facticity”	of	an	inscription,	and	information	post-translation	via	the	re-coded	data	inherent	in	every	act	of	recording.	Within	photography,	we	can	and	often	do	consider	the	framing,	technological	intervention,	political	stake,	motivations,	and	overall	intentions	of	the	photographer	taking	a	photograph.	Most	importantly,	such	ways	of	understanding	the	photograph	are	learned	over	great	lengths	of	time	and	are	constantly	challenged.	The	production	of	meaning	via	technological	instruments	within	artistic	practice	has	always	relied	on	contextualization,	questioning,	and	experimentation.	While	the	institution	of	science	has,	throughout	its	history,	produced	very	robust	methods	for	addressing	the	
                                               
8 Ibid., 51. 
9 Rosalind E. Krauss, L’Amour Fou: Photography and Surrealism (Washington, D.C.: Corcoran Gallery of Art, 
1985), 35. Emphasis added.  
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construction	of	facts	internally,	the	notion	of	values,	politics,	and	power	have	not	been	so	transparent,	and	have	only	recently	been	questioned.10		Further,	the	increasing	reliance	on	the	abstracted	forms	and	processes	of	“techno-instruments”	(to	be	explored	in	more	depth	shortly)	when	producing	“raw	data”	within	scientific	inquiry	leads	to	representational	obstacles.11	For	example,	a	scale	has	a	tangible	and	tacit	relationship	to	the	material	world	that	can	be	understood	directly	through	practice	and	interaction.12	Even	so,	a	scale	may	gradually	lose	accuracy	over	time,	be	manipulated	by	a	third	party,	or	its	values	might	be	recorded	incorrectly	by	a	user.	If	we	consider	the	scale	as	a	type	of	camera,	it	leads	to	new	questions,	as	even	a	simple	tool	requires	much	contextualization	and	has	the	potential	to	distort	output.	As	such,	a	patent	protected	computer	program	that	translates	a	given	sensor’s	analysis	of,	for	example,	genetic	material,	is	even	less	tacit	as	knowledge,	and	less	directly	linked	to	the	human	body	in	both	form	and	function.13	This	means	that	the	potential	for	misleading	or	unanticipated	data	also	grows	in	tandem	with	these	decreasingly	tacit	forms	of	knowledge,	as	an	operator	of	such	an	instrument	has	restricted	knowledge	of	the	instrument	they	are	interacting	with	(in	its	internal	operation	and	whether	or	not	it	is	functioning	correctly).	Further,	the	choice	of	what	data	is	worth	recording,	what	is	“fundable”	research,	and	how	personal	politics	within	the	laboratory	effect	experimental	outcomes,	all	provide	critical	points	for	contemplating	the	validity	and	facticity	of	inscriptions.	All	of	these	concerns	undermine	the	seemingly	indexical	relationship	between	
                                               
10 Heather Douglas, “Rejecting the Ideals of Value Free Science,” in Value-Free Science? Ideals and 
Illusions, eds. Harold Kincaid, John Dupre and Alison Wylie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 121. 
11 Geoffrey C. Bowker convincingly argues against any notion that “raw data” exists, which is why it 
appears in quotations here. His arguments align with the concept that Levi Strauss introduces regarding 
the “natural” and the “social,” and how data can simply not exist without some human intervention, and 
thus cannot be considered as “raw” in any way (referring to it instead as “cooked”. See: Geoffrey C. 
Bowker, "Data Flakes: An Afterword to 'Raw Data’ Is an Oxymoron," in ”'Raw Data' Is an Oxymoron” 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 168. 
12 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 4. 
13 The notion that knowledge can become less “tacit” refers to Michael Polanyi’s categories of explicit and 
tacit knowledge. In The Tacit Dimension, tacit knowledge is expressed as a form of knowledge that is 
impossible to articulate only by verbal means, such as a skill or personal experience. Relying on a machine 
to provide data, with no understanding of its function, might then be considered an ever more abstracted 
form of knowledge then the tacit. See: Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Chicago: University of 




                                               
14 Stephan Marsland, Machine Learning: An Algorithmic Perspective (New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC 
press: 2015), 5; Neil Johnson, "Abrupt rise of new machine ecology beyond human response time," 
Scientific Reports 3 (2013): 2627. 
15 This is discussed further in Section 1.4: “Philosophies of Science”. 
16 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 3-7.  
17 Which occur after(1) the faithful image/copy, (2) the perversion of reality, and (3) the masking of the 
absence of reality. Ibid., 3-7. 
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For	Baudrillard,	however,	this	final	regime	is	one	of	total	equivalency.	Cultural	products	(we	may	include	science	here	as	well)	need	no	longer	pretend	to	be	real	in	a	naïve	sense	because	the	experiences	of	a	consumer’s	life	are	so	predominantly	artificial	that	even	claims	to	reality	are	expected	to	be	phrased	in	artificial,	"hyperreal"	terms.18	The	term	hyperreal	seems	rather	fitting	when	discussing	the	output	of	the	LHC,	all	things	considered.	Vilém	Flusser	extends	this	notion	by	considering	images	as	mediations	that	“obscure,”	rather	than	represent	the	world,	until	“human	beings’	lives	finally	become	a	function	of	the	images	they	create.”19	He	considers	photographs	as	“abstractions	of	a	third	order”	that	are	inherently	more	codified	than	“traditional”	pre-technological	images,	and	warns	about	the	danger	of	regarding	technical	images	as	objective.	As	Flusser	proposes,	it	“is	not	the	world	out	there	that	is	real…only	the	photograph	is	real.”20	In	other	words,	reality	is	no	longer	a	useful	way	of	describing	the	world,	as	we	rely	wholly	on	artificial	constructs	and	symbologies	to	describe	it.		This	conclusion	has	clear	ramifications	for	consumers	and	institutions	that	rely	on	the	capture	of	coded	phenomena	via	mediating	technologies	in	the	search	for	enlightened/objective	truth.	The	further	we	mine	for	“truth”	using	increasingly	abstracted	technological	instruments,	the	further	entrenched	we	must	become	in	the	signs	and	simulations	we	use	to	describe	it.	Therefore,	we	must	become	comfortable	with	analyzing	and	questioning	those	signs	carefully.	While	representations	emerging	from	scientific	endeavour	(via	press	coverage	and	public	relations)	are	apparent	visual	examples	of	points	of	possible	misrepresentation,	contemplating	Baudrillard's	notions	puts	even	the	practice	of	performing	science	into	philosophical	contention	with	its	internal	raison	d’etre.	How	is	it	possible	to	come	closer	to	our	subject	through	greater	abstraction?			
                                               
18 Ibid., 6. 
19 ”Ontologically, traditional images are abstractions of the first order insofar as they abstract from the 
concrete world while technical images are abstractions of the third order. They abstract from texts which 
abstract from traditional images which themselves abstract from the concrete world.” Vilém Flusser, 
Towards a Philosophy of Photography (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 10. 
20 Ibid., 14-5, 37.  
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 1.3 ABSTRACTING FORMS 	 The	inscription	machines	that	scientists	employ	have	grown	steadily	in	scale	and	sophistication	since	the	Enlightenment.	Their	functions	are	multiple,	from	recording	data	using	sensors	to	processing	unorganized	data	via	computation,	and	finally	to	the	reintroduction	of	some	form	of	legible	information	and	its	eventual	dissemination.	Scientific	instruments,	therefore,	can	no	longer	be	symbolized	(or	visualized)	by	traditional	forms	of	representation.	They	do	not	assume	the	visage	of	a	beaker	or	a	measuring	stick,	nor	merely	a	series	of	convex	mirrors	redirecting	beams	of	light.	They	have	donned	a	fluid	and	nearly	indiscernible	presence	within	our	social	and	cultural	landscapes,	often	spilling	outside	of	what	we	would	consider	the	traditional	laboratory.21	A	further	layer	of	complication	is	added	when	we	consider	the	tendency	of	such	instruments	to	become	“black-boxes”	when	employed	in	fields	of	research	and	knowledge	production.		The	functions	that	occur	inside	black-boxes	are	inherently	invisible	to	the	observer;	such	instruments	are	designed	to	accept	input	and	render	output	based	on	unseen	calculations.	Even	the	simplest	of	cameras,	like	the	large-format	view	camera,	operate	in	this	way.	While	they	function	to	simplify	workflow	(or	perhaps	hide	proprietary	algorithms),	black-box	instruments	do	so	at	the	expense	of	transparency	between	form	and	function.	As	a	relevant	example,	if	we	consider	the	increasing	reliance	on	computing	in	every	domain	of	scientific	and	technological	understanding,	withholding	the	computer	source	code	critical	to	understanding	and	evaluating	computer	programs	renders	significant	portions	of	research	uninterpretable	at	the	site	of	research.22	The	above	is	a	concern	if	knowledge	is	considered	a	social	construction	because	it	limits	the	ability	to	develop	a	history	or	philosophy	of	technology.	Furthermore,	there	is	a	strong	tendency	to	regard	
                                               
21 For example, the SETI project uses a network of home computers provided by the interested public to 
help analyze an abundance of collected data in the search for alien signals from space. Also, curing cancer 
has been “gamified” to allow “players” to help analyze real genetic data. See: Larry Greenemeier, "Play to 
Cure: Genes in Space," Scientific American, February 18, 2015, accessed March 24, 2018, 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/citizen-science/play-to-cure-genes-in-space/. 
22 A. Morin, et al., "Shining Light into Black-boxes," Science 336, no. 6078 (2012): 159. 
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technology	and	instruments	as	the	lesser	and	less	meaningful	relatives	of	science,	and	because	science	deals	with	the	fundamentals	of	human	knowledge,	it	has	historically	been	considered	the	more	valued	and	significant	topic.23	However,	can	we	continue	to	regard	the	instruments	that	produce	knowledge	as	less	integral	than	the	act	of	investigation,	particularly	if	the	investigation	cannot	be	done	without	instruments?		One	example	of	instrumental	reliance	is	the	images	regularly	published	by	NASA	produced	by	distant	telescopes	showing	wildly	colourful	galaxies,	which	eventually	function	as	representations	of	the	objective	real.	However,	the	true	form	of	a	galaxy	in	any	experiential	and	even	visual	sense	varies	wildly	from	these	instrumental	representations.	The	telescopes	that	collect	such	data	just	happen	to	be	our	only	source	of	such	images,	and	the	only	way	we	have	of	visualizing	such	distant	phenomena.	The	images	they	produce	must	be	manipulated	before	publication,	as	images	from	telescopes	are	often	taken	through	three	different	colour	filters,	which	must	then	be	combined	using	software	and	a	human	hand	to	enhance	their	legibility	and	understanding.24	Without	such	manipulation,	the	images	would	only	be	legible	to	experts	in	the	field,	leaving	discoveries	inaccessible	to	those	not	versed	in	the	highly	coded	scientific	language;	however,	this	further	distortion	in	order	to	make	legible	becomes	rather	ironic	when	considering	the	chain	of	symbolic	understanding	that	must	be	navigated	by	the	observer	of	the	final	image.		All	instruments	and	technologies	introduce	symbols	(whether	or	not	they	are	capable	of	producing	images)	that	significantly	alter	perceptions	of	the	world	around	us.	Even	some	of	the	earliest	tools	humans	produced	(for	example,	fire	and	stone	tools)	significantly	altered	the	way	we	perceive	time	and	space.	The	illuminated	darkness	and	the	speed	of	tooled-production	are	simple	examples	of	paradigm	shifts	in	perception	realized	through	technology.	As	instruments	become	more	complex	and	coded,	however,	we	come	to	rely	more	heavily	on	their	symbolic	
                                               
23 Langdon Winner, "Upon Opening the Black-box and Finding it Empty: Social Constructivism and the 
Philosophy of Technology," Science, Technology, & Human Values 18, no. 3 (1993): 365. 
24 Mike Wall, “Conspiracy Debunked: NASA Photoshops Images for Good Reason,”Space.com, October 15, 




                                               
25 Victor Tausk, "On the Origin of the ‘Influencing Machine’ in schizophrenia," The Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly 2, no. 3-4 (1933): 519-520. 
26 Quantum computing is a reasonable example here. Symbolic and metaphorical attempts at explaining 
such instruments are incredibly difficult, as I can personally attest. For a non-expert in the field of 
quantum computing, such a technology is highly coded and difficult to understand.   
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workings	for	users	to	internalize.	While	Tausk’s	patients	may	have	suffered	from	this	disconnect	more	than	most	others	within	society	due	to	mental	illness,	it	is	likely	that	many	others	experience	at	least	some	crisis	of	understanding	with	regards	to	the	constant	tide	of	evolving	contemporary	technologies.	As	such,	the	above	examples	are	useful	when	shifting	the	conversation	of	instruments	from	the	realm	of	the	physical,	to	the	cultural	and	philosophical.	 	In	a	series	of	lectures	delivered	in	Bremen	in	1949,	Martin	Heidegger	introduced	technology	as	not	simply	an	instrument	or	tool	used	by	man,	but	something	whose	essence	(Gestell)	functions	dually	to	reveal	truth	through	“Enframing,”	and	subsequently	acts	as	a	form	of	mediation	that	hinders	the	possibility	of	encountering	the	world	as	it	“is.”	This	conceptual	turn	distances	us	from	the	pure	physical	understanding	of	technological	objects,	towards	one	of	understanding	technology	as	grounded	within	the	social	and	the	cultural.	Heidegger	warned	that	the	essence	of	technology	relegates	humanity	to	an	endless	chain	of	ordering,	while	expanding	on	what	he	means	by	the	term	Enframing:		 Enframing	 does	 not	 simply	 endanger	 man	 in	 his	 relationship	 to	himself	 and	 to	 everything	 that	 is.	 As	 a	 destining,	 [Enframing]	banishes	man	into	that	kind	of	revealing	which	is	an	ordering.	Where	this	 ordering	 holds	 sway,	 it	 drives	 out	 every	 other	 possibility	 of	revealing.	Above	all,	Enframing	conceals	that	revealing	which,	in	the	sense	of	poiēsis,	lets	what	presences	come	forth	into	appearance	[…]	Thus	the	challenging	Enframing	not	only	conceals	a	 former	way	of	revealing,	bringing-forth,	but	it	conceals	revealing	itself	and	with	it	That	wherein	unconcealment,	i.e.,	truth,	comes	to	pass.27			In	the	case	of	scientific	instruments,	we	might	understand	“ordering”	as	the	obsessive	collection	of	the	symbolic	representations	required	by	scientific	advancement.	The	absence	of	“revealing,”	here,	can	refer	to	the	way	we	cannot	fully	understand	the	inner	workings	of	a	plethora	of	techno-instruments	by	using	them	in	
                                               
27 Poiēsis is a term that will be discussed in the following section, as Alexander Galloway uses the term as 
well. For now, it is sufficient to say that the Greek term originated as an expression for the activity in which 
a person brings something into being that did not exist before. Martin Heidegger, "The Question 
Concerning Technology," 27. 
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the	act	for	which	they	were	created.28	For	example,	to	understand	increasingly	complex	phenomena,	one	must	accept	certain	facts	(embodied	within	an	instrument),	or	be	forced	to	rediscover	them	ad	infinitum.	Finally,	“Enframing”	can	refer	to	the	ways	we	have	come	to	accept	coded	phenomena	without	question,	as	the	scientist	must	do	to	advance	knowledge	production.29			The	danger	Heidegger	envisioned,	however,	is	that	technology	can	reign	and	become	the	trap	of	the	interface	that	we	experience	today.	It	produces	an	inability	to	see	outside	of	its	mediation	(or	its	symbolic	representations),	as	it	becomes	all	too	ingrained	within	a	coded	contemporary	reality.30	Many	other	examples	of	such	a	phenomenon	exist	today,	such	as	the	Internet	as	a	virtual	place	that	can	feel	as	real	as	any	physical	space.	These	phenomena	rely	on	a	symbolic	understanding	of	the	world	where	the	technical	codes	underlying	their	functioning	are	either	forgotten	or	deemed	unnecessary	to	know	by	the	majority.	This,	of	course,	includes,	for	example,	the	use	of	scientific	metaphors	to	understand	quantum	mechanics,	and	all	of	the	learned	theories	one	might	use	to	interpret	complex	phenomena.	However,	Heidegger	argued	that	it	is	the	recognition	of	the	danger	of	technology	that	allows	us	to	glimpse	and	respond	to	what	has	been	forgotten	about	our	understanding	of	the	world,	prior	to	a	technology’s	introduction.		Recognition	of	danger	tends	to	spur	a	desire	for	historical	insight,	as	when	a	greater	understanding	of	the	roots	of	an	event,	such	as	the	Internet	becoming	an	addiction	or	stock	markets	teetering	towards	collapse,	provokes	an	enlightened	discourse.	Humanity	is	only	powerless	against	the	veiling	effect	of	technology	if	it	fails	to	question,	for	technology	can	never	be	overcome	through	action,	because,	in	Heidegger’s	words,	we	are	never	its	master.	The	conclusion	of	his	lecture	offers	both	
                                               
28 “Revealing” to Heidegger often refers to our tendency to consider every object as a potential raw 
material for technical action. Andrew Feenburg summarizes: “Objects enter our experience only in so far 
as we notice their usefulness in the technological system.” Andrew Feenberg, “Critical Theory of 
Technology: An Overview,” in Tailoring Biotechnologies 1, 2005, 48.     
29 As Latour suggests, the scientific paper becomes accepted as true if enough members of the community 
reference it. In this way, each discovery “Enframes” the next.  
30 Max Frisch offers in his novel Homo Faber: “Technology is the knack of so arranging the world that we 
don’t have to experience it.” See Max Frisch, Homo Faber, trans. Michael Bullock (London: Abelard-
Shuman, 1959), 178. 
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a	timely	warning	and	a	potential	form	of	resistance	that	will	form	the	basis	of	further	discussion:		 Whether	art	may	be	granted	this	highest	possibility	of	its	essence	in	the	 midst	 of	 the	 extreme	 danger,	 no	 one	 can	 tell.	 Yet	 we	 can	 be	astounded.	 Before	 what?	 Before	 this	 other	 possibility:	 that	 the	frenziedness	of	technology	may	entrench	itself	everywhere	to	such	an	 extent	 that	 someday,	 throughout	 everything	 technological,	 the	essence	of	technology	may	come	to	presence	in	the	coming-to-pass	of	 truth	 [...]	 Because	 the	 essence	 of	 technology	 is	 nothing	technological,	 essential	 reflection	 upon	 technology	 and	 decisive	confrontation	with	it	must	happen	in	a	realm	that	is,	on	the	one	hand,	akin	to	the	essence	of	technology	and,	on	the	other,	fundamentally	different	from	it.31		 It	is	important	to	note	the	timing	of	Heidegger’s	lecture,	delivered	only	five	years	after	Alan	Turing	developed	Colossus	to	break	Adolf	Hitler’s	Enigma	encryption	machine—often	considered	the	precursor	to	the	modern	computer—and	only	three	years	following	the	construction,	testing,	and	use	of	atomic	war	technology.	This	moment	in	history	contained	the	potential	for	a	fearful	escalation	of	entrenched	technology;	how	it	can	conceal	through	codes	and	violence,	rather	than	become	a	force	of	revelation.	In	a	more	contemporary	context,	we	may	consider	the	mass	displacement	of	employment	by	artificial	intelligence,	identity	theft	via	social	networks,	the	dangers	of	unsolicited	hacking	of	both	personal	and	governmental	networks,	the	danger	of	artificially	controlled	automobiles,	and	the	growing	roots	of	technological	reliance	in	every	crevice	of	daily	life.	As	such,	Herbert	Marcuse	regards	technology	as	“a	mode	of	organization	and	perpetuating	(or	changing)	social	relationships,	a	manifestation	of	prevalent	thought	and	behaviour	patterns,	and	[an]	instrument	for	control	and	domination,”	which	can	escalate	such	concerns	to	frightful	levels.32	Considering	technology	can	be	used	by	those	with	greater	means,	to	wield	it	proficiently	and	at	a	significant	scale,	it	is	reasonable	to	continuously	reflect	on	the	instruments	which	can	significantly	alter	power	dynamics.		
                                               
31 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 35. 
32 Marcuse, Herbert, and Douglas Kellner. Technology, War and Fascism: Collected Papers of Herbert 
Marcuse. London: Routledge, 1998. 
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In	his	conclusion,	Heidegger	proclaimed	that	the	only	force	possessing	the	ability	to	counter	the	extreme	danger	of	the	“coming	presence	of	technology	that	threatens	revealing”	once	shared	a	similar	name,	technē,	or	the	power	possessed	by	the	fine	arts	as	imagined	in	ancient	Greece.33	However,	prior	to	an	analysis	of	how	art	and	the	production	of	cultural	artifacts	can	be	a	fruitful	source	of	revelation,	which	follows	in	the	second	chapter,	it	is	useful	to	briefly	explore	the	current	state	of	technology	in	culture	via	the	particularly	timely	theory	of	interfaces,	as	it	will	be	a	useful	tool	of	analysis	in	the	following	chapter.						1.4	 CONTEMPORARY	TECHNOLOGY	AND	INTERFACES			 In	24/7:	Late	Capitalism	and	the	End	of	Sleep,	Jonathan	Crary	presents	us	with	a	contemporary	globalized	culture	brimming	with	technological	artifacts	and	influences.	Throughout	this	text,	arguments	about	contemporary	technology’s	grasp	on	our	perceptions	of	space	and	time,	as	well	as	our	relentless	desire	for	the	techno-commodities	of	capitalistic	enterprise,	form	a	thesis	that	can	seem	overwhelming:	Crary	argues	that	the	newness	of	technological	advances	creates	tools	that	do	not	have	time	to	slip	into	the	periphery	of	one’s	life,	require	our	full	attention	to	operate,	and	introduce	a	constant	“now-ness”	without	reflection.34	Rather	than	provide	the	means,	technology	becomes	the	end	in	itself;	it	is	the	instrument	that	demands	its	own	ever-efficient	use,	never	reaching	a	state	of	user	or	producer	contentment.35	This	insight	forces	us	to	reflect	on	Heidegger’s	call	for	further	reflection	on	technology;	for	it	is	the	constant	requirement	to	mediate	through	technology	that	we	can	seemingly	never	fully	grasp	that	hinders	our	ability	to	think	beyond	its	simulations.	While	Crary’s	argument	focuses	more	directly	on	corporate	and	political	social	structures,	it	also	reverberates	throughout	many	other	contemporary	
                                               
33 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 35. 
34 Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (New York: Verso, 2013), 45. 
35 Ibid., 45-6. 
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practices,	including	those	of	the	scientific	laboratory	(not	without	its	own	corporate	and	political	stimuli).36			 Paul	Virilio	observes	similar	conditions	in	the	cultures	of	science	and	the	cyberspace	of	networks.	With	a	focus	on	the	growing	abundance	of	information	via	technology,	Virilio	points	to	similar	enslavement	via	optical	and	technical	devices.	He	describes	how	technology	as	a	mediator	cannot	exist	without	the	potential	for	accidents,	further	complicating	our	imbroglio	with	it.	For	example,	Virilio	argues	that	the	invention	of	the	locomotive	also	contained	within	it	the	invention	of	derailment,	and	perceives	the	accident	as	a	negative	outgrowth	of	social	positivism	and	scientific	progress.	37	By	Virilio’s	account,	the	growth	of	technology,	namely	television	(but	easily	the	Internet	and	more	complex	phenomena	as	well),	separates	us	directly	from	the	events	of	real	space	and	real	time,	pointing	to	a	loss	of	wisdom	and	sight	of	our	immediate	horizon,	as	we	“resort	to	the	indirect	horizon	of	our	dissimulated	environment.”38	Indeed,	“one	of	the	earliest	signs	of	technology	complicating	human	life	was	the	advent	of	the	railroad,	which	necessitated	the	development	of	standardized	time	zones	in	the	United	States,	to	coordinate	the	dozens	of	new	trains	that	were	crisscrossing	the	continent.”39	Samuel	Arbesman,	in	an	essay	considering	the	indecipherability	of	contemporary	technology,	continues:	“The	nightmare	scenario	is	not	Skynet—a	self-aware	network	declaring	war	on	humanity—but	messy	systems	so	convoluted	that	nearly	any	glitch…can	happen.”40	
                                               
36 I experienced these stimuli throughout many conversations during my own site visits. Directors and 
Public Relations officers from CERN and The Pierre Auger Observatory (amongst many others) cite the 
political nature of gaining the support of public funding during moments of increased competition and 
funding cuts. Bruno Latour also explores these macro issues in depth. See: Latour, “Give me a laboratory 
and I will raise the world,” in Science Observed, 141 (1983): 170. 
37 Virilio offers at least two articulations of this idea: 1) "When you invent the ship, you also invent the 
shipwreck; when you invent the plane you also invent the plane crash; and when you invent electricity, 
you invent electrocution.... Every technology carries its own negativity, which is invented at the same time 
as technical progress" (Paul Virilio, Politics of the Very Worst (New York: Semiotext(e), 1999), 89); and 2) 
“To invent the sailing ship or the steamer is to invent the shipwreck. To invent the train is to invent the rail 
accident of derailment. To invent the family automobile is to produce the pile-up on the highway” (Paul 
Virilio, The Original Accident (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 10). 
38 Paul Virilio, The Original Accident, 38-40. 
39 Samuel Arbesman, "Is Technology Making the World Indecipherable?" Aeon, January 6, 2014, accessed 




                                               
41 Marc A. Edwards, et al., "Academic Research in the 21st century: Maintaining Scientific Integrity in a 
Climate of Perverse Incentives and Hypercompetition," in Environmental Engineering Science 34, no. 1 
(2017): 51. 
42 Ibid., 51. 
43 Ibid., 51-61. 
44 Ahmed Alkhateeb, “Science Has Outgrown the Human Mind and Its Limited Capacities,” in Aeon, April 
24, 2017, accessed on March 24, 2018, http://www.aeon.com/ideas/science-has-outgrown-the-human-
mind-and-its-limited-capacities. 
45 Richard Van Noorden, “Scientists May Be Reaching a Peak in Reading Habits,” Nature News, Nature 
Publishing Group, February 3, 2014, accessed March 24, 2018, http://www.nature.com/news/scientists-
may-be-reaching-a-peak-in-reading-habits-1.14658; Glenn C. Begley and Ellis M. Lee, "Drug Development: 











                                               




                                               
47 As a humorous example, during a site visit to ATNF Parkes Radio Telescope, a scientist relayed a story to 
me of how a microwave oven on the grounds of the research centre was mistaken for distant radio 
signals, and had baffled scientists for 17 years. 
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findings),	and	that	do	not	reflect	the	realities	of	the	experiment	that	had	been	conducted.48	A	striking	example	of	this	is	Andrew	Wakefield’s	study	that	claimed	to	identify	a	relationship	between	vaccines	and	autism,	which	was	retracted	by	the	British	Journal	of	Medicine	in	2010,	on	the	grounds	that	the	data	contained	within	was	fixed.	One	can	only	assume	that	attempts	to	contribute	to	scientific	understanding	that	are	not	grounded	in	rigorous	analysis—in	the	hopes	that	even	the	experts	in	a	given	field	of	study	will	not	decode	the	“inner-workings”	of	an	experiment—relies	on	the	growth	of	complex	symbols	that	the	majority	cannot	be	expected	to	understand.	To	publish	a	scientific	paper	that	is	inherently	deceptive,	or	so	complex	that	others	choose	to	accept	it	without	understanding	it,	would	only	be	possible	in	a	moment	of	representational	crisis.	And	if	such	production	inspires	a	temptation	amongst	scientists	to	fake	and	alter	data	in	the	hopes	of	achieving	“demigod”	status,	while	knowing	that	false	data	could	not	possibly	withstand	the	micro-social	phenomenon	inherent	within	the	construction	of	facts	through	the	laboratory	that	Latour	refers	to,	it	is	necessary	to	ask	how	mediation	through	symbolic	representation	affects	the	cultural	perception	of	other	less	rigorously	controlled	environments.	49		As	contemporary	science	relies	almost	entirely	on	inscription	devices	to	interpret	phenomena	and	advance	knowledge,	visual	culture	relies	on	inscriptions	to	construct	the	social	reality	it	inhabits.	Alexander	Galloway’s	theory	of	Interfaces	helps	to	dissect	the	impact	of	such	an	entanglement.	All	hybrid	contemporary	media	have	highly	coded	and	symbolic	messages.	Galloway,	like	Heidegger,	stresses	the	importance	of	understanding	that	Interfaces	not	be	confused	with	the	screen	or	device	itself	(Heidegger	would	say	tool	or	instrument),	but	rather	are	political	frameworks	that	encompass	all	potential	modes	of	mediation	through	use	(or	Enframing).	The	challenge	then	lies	in	decoding	the	Interface	and	locating	the	meanings	hidden	within	the	inscriptions	produced	throughout	all	forms	of	visual	culture.	In	this	regard,	Galloway	offers	four	regimes	of	signification	that	categorize	
                                               
48 Jill Neimark, “The Retraction War,” Aeon.co, December 23, 2014, accessed March 24, 2018, 
https://aeon.co/essays/are-the-retraction-wars-a-sign-that-science-is-broken. 




                                               
50 Alexander Galloway, The Interface Effect (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), 45-53. 
51 Ibid., 42. 
52 This is covered more extensively in section 2.3. 
53 Ibid., 50. 
54 Ibid., 49-50. 
55 Galloway does not claim that the philosophies of Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as 
examples, are not political. Instead, he uses the term “unaligned” to describe the ways in which they can 
often be used by opposing political regimes when interpreted in differing ways. In this way, we might 
consider the ramifications of contemporary and future technologies that are also often represented as 






                                               
56 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 27.   
57 Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 




seemingly	objective	events	that	occur	in	laboratories,	leaving	every	experiment	subject	to	a	vast	array	of	potential	influences.			 Historically,	science	has	been	practiced	and	dominated	by	a	minority	of	privileged	contributors.	Donna	Haraway	proposes	that	feminist	perspectives	are	vital	in	the	analysis	of	scientific	structures	via	the	notion	of	“situated	knowledges,”	or	rather,	an	acceptance	that	all	forms	of	knowledge	offer	only	a	partial	and	biased	perspective.	Not	unlike	Heidegger,	she	likens	the	effect	of	the	tools	and	instruments	of	science	to	visualizing	tricks	and	powers	that	disembody	viewers	through	technology,	so	much	so,	that	objectivity	becomes	impossible.	According	to	Haraway:			 There	 is	no	unmediated	photograph	or	passive	 camera	obscura	 in	scientific	 accounts	 of	 bodies	 and	machines;	 there	 are	 only	 highly	specific	visual	possibilities,	each	with	a	wonderfully	detailed,	active,	partial	 way	 of	 organizing	 worlds.	 All	 these	 pictures	 of	 the	 world	should	not	be	allegories	of	 infinite	mobility	and	 interchangeability	but	of	elaborate	specificity	and	difference	and	the	loving	care	people	might	take	to	learn	how	to	see	faithfully	from	another’s	point	of	view,	even	when	the	other	is	our	own	machine.58		While	aspects	of	this	declaration	may	seem	conspicuously	evident	in	the	contemporary	context,	it	is	still	easy	to	be	seduced	by	the	notion	that	knowledge	is	advancing	toward	some	form	of	unification,	where	partial	perspectives	will	fuse	into	a	single	whole	truth.59	Such	a	notion	is	the	remnant	of	an	ideal	set	forth	by	an	institution	that	promised	such	a	thing,	though	we	must	now	accept	that	all	knowledge	is	shrouded	by	mediations	that	shape	its	reception.	Escaping	such	epistemological	traps	requires	“politics	and	epistemologies	of	location,	positioning,	and	situating,”	where	rational	knowledge	is	a	process	of	critical	interpretation	
                                               
58 Ibid., 175. 
59 This approach to knowledge is discussed in detail by Sandra Mitchell in defence of an integrated 
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and	presses	it	into	the	service	of	capital.”64	Heather	Douglas	further	obliges	these	sentiments	in	her	questioning	of	the	roots	of	value	within	science,	in	the	hopes	of	dispelling	the	myths	that	science	can	function	as	a	“value-free”	institution.	According	to	Douglas,	it	is	via	the	cultural	stranglehold	of	objectivity	as	value-free	that	notions	of	value	have	become	blurred	within	the	practice	and	dissemination	of	scientific	endeavour.	In	other	words,	objectivity	and	value—much	to	their	detriment—are	often	considered	morally	contradictory.65		Douglas	argues	that	rejecting	the	ideal	of	value-free	science	does	not	diminish	science’s	objectivity	and	that	we	have	plenty	of	remaining	resources	with	which	to	understand	and	evaluate	the	objectivity	of	science.	She	proposes	a	value-laden	approach	that	might	allow	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	nature	of	scientific	controversy,	and	in	many	cases,	“even	help	speed	resolution	of	those	controversies.”66	Such	an	approach	calls	for	greater	ethical	and	social	reflection	among	scientists,	and	Douglas	implores	that	we	“hold	scientists	to	the	same	responsibilities	that	the	rest	of	us	have	[and	that]	the	judgments	needed	to	do	science	cannot	escape	the	consideration	of	potential	consequences,	both	intended	and	unintended,	both	epistemically	relevant	and	socially	relevant.”67	While	Douglas	implies	that	such	considerations	should	be	the	responsibility	of	the	scientist,	useful	reflection	can	and	should	be	practiced	throughout	cultural	production	as	well.	This	is	one	area	where	greater	participation	between	cultural	and	scientific	producers	would	be	most	fruitful,	as	the	analysis	of	the	ramifications	of	science—creatively,	morally,	and	logically—will	continue	to	be	of	import	as	science	continues	to	produce	artifacts	that	directly	affect	our	relationship	to	the	world.	As	Douglas	iterated	in	her	well-formed	conclusion,	certain	kinds	of	diversity	may	significantly	enrich	scientific	inquiry.			
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	 This	discussion	stems	from	the	notion	that	science	does	not	just	produce	facts,	but	ultimately	things,	and	these	things	should	be	foregrounded	rather	than	hidden.	As	John	Dupré	argues,	the	separation	that	occurs	between	scientific	investigation	and	its	end	products	in	effect	masks	the	value/function	relationship	we	need	to	understand	in	order	to	evaluate	the	science	that	matters	to	us.68	In	other	words,	without	value	judgements,	there	is	far	too	much	ground	to	cover	and	far	too	many	potential	pitfalls	and	wasted	efforts	on	our	route	to	knowledge.	As	a	partial	solution	towards	evaluating	the	value	of	scientific	inquiry,	Helen	Longino	clarifies	that	two	forms	of	value	must	be	present	within	science,	the	first	being	constitutive	and	the	second	contextual,	both	of	which	should	be	given	equal	consideration.	Constitutive	values	are	those	that	determine	what	constitutes	acceptable	scientific	practice	or	scientific	method,	while	contextual	value	refers	to	personal,	social,	and	cultural	perceptions	of	what	“ought	to	be.”69	This	way,	the	social	and	cultural	idea	that	value	and	objectivity	are	inherently	conflicted	can	be	re-evaluated	as	potentially	responsible	for	lack	of	autocritique	within	knowledge	production	at	a	time	when	more	is	undoubtedly	necessary.		Longino	cites	many	examples,	such	as	the	pharmaceutical	industry’s	preference	to	a	search	for	cures	rather	than	preventions,	a	preference	in	which	internal	and	external	factors	are	clearly	at	play,	when	selecting	the	goals	of	inquiry.	Barry	Barns	and	David	Bloor,	in	their	strong	program	in	the	sociology	of	science,	hold	that	social	interests	are	indeed	profoundly	involved	within	scientific	practice,	and	thus	ultimately	question	the	so-called	autonomy	and	epistemological	integrity	of	science.70	They	argue	that	(1)	there	is	no	transcendent	or	context	independent	criterion	of	rational	justification	that	renders	some	beliefs	(hypothesis)	more	credible	than	others;	and	(2)	that	explanations	for	why	a	given	set	of	beliefs	is	found	in	a	given	context	depends	on	features	of	the	context	and	not	on	intrinsic	properties	
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of	the	beliefs.71	According	to	Longino,	all	outcomes	in	science	are	negotiated.	However,	if	belief	is	context	dependent	and	no	intrinsic	properties	are	informing	rational	justification,	then	a	more	open-ended	approach	must	be	considered	in	our	engagement	with	knowledge	production.	Integrated	pluralism	offers	one	such	approach,	which,	as	Sandra	Mitchell	argues,	is	grounded	in	“the	suggestion	that	our	current	best	theories	of	the	nature	of	nature	exactly	capture	the	world	in	all	its	details	is	hubris.”72	She	prefaces	her	argument	by	noting	that	the	idealized	and	partial	character	of	our	representations,	and	the	inherently	social	and	political	nature	of	knowledge	production,	suggest	that	there	will	never	be	a	single	account	that	can	solely	describe	and	explain	complex	phenomena.	As	such,	a	plausible	model	of	pluralism—the	idea	that	knowledge	is	produced	via	an	array	of	social	actors	and	partial	perspectives	of	differing	expertise—can	be	forged	from	understanding	that	causal	models	are	abstractions	that	will	always	remain	idealizations,	because	they	are	not	universal	but	context	dependent.	For	example,	a	theoretical	model	of	climate	change	functions	at	a	merely	theoretical	level	and	can	never	deal	with	the	complexity	of	an	entire	system	of	unpredictable	moving	parts.	In	fact,	Mitchell	grounds	her	argument	within	the	philosophy	that	complexity	is	a	critical	tool	for	understanding	the	nature	and	limits	of	diversity	in	representations.	She	thus	implies	that	in	order	to	accurately	describe	the	world	around	us,	many	forms	of	knowledge	must	be	integrated	in	the	hopes	of	providing	any	clear	description	regarding	what	we	aim	to	represent:		 Scientific	representations	are	abstractions	or	idealizations.	They	can	represent	 only	 partial	 features	 of	 individuals	 rather	 than	 the	individuals	 themselves	 as	 complex	 casual	 agents.	 An	 individual	human	being	is	truly	described	in	different	theories	at	the	same	time	as	a	host	to	a	parasite,	a	consumer	in	an	ecosystem,	and	a	phenotypic	expression	of	a	set	of	genotypes,	as	well	as	a	mammalian	organism,	a	homeostatic	endotherm,	and	organization	of	multiple	cell	types,	and	so	on.73			
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The	list	Mitchell	initiates	begins	with	various	forms	of	representations	and	is	necessarily	limited,	yet	we	can	easily	imagine	it	branching	infinitely.	Presumably,	as	a	philosopher	of	science,	her	notions	do	not	necessarily	consider	forms	of	knowledge	production	outside	of	science,	but	there	is	no	reason	they	should	not.	Rudolf	Carnap,	a	major	contributor	to	a	stream	of	philosophy	called	logical	positivism	(chiefly	concerned	with	how	experience	justifies	empirical	knowledge),	offers	the	following:	“Let	us	learn	from	the	lessons	of	history.	Let	us	grant	those	who	work	in	any	special	field	of	investigation	the	freedom	to	use	any	form	of	expression	which	seems	useful	to	them.”74	Such	an	approach	stems	from	the	idea	that	forms	of	expression	deemed	inadequate	or	unsuccessful	will	eventually	be	eliminated;	however,	they	should	not	be	rejected	a	priori.		Paul	Feyerband	directs	us	to	the	final	notion	that	we	will	explore	from	the	philosophy	of	science,	one	that	poignantly	relishes	in	the	irrationality	of	scientific	progress	and	the	dangers	of	ignoring	other	forms	of	knowledge	production.	In	his	notes	on	knowledge,	science,	and	relativism,	Feyerband	argues	that	(1)	scientific	investigation	lacks	the	uniformity	that	is	needed	to	give	us	a	coherent	point-of-view;	(2)	science	has	frequently	employed	procedures	which	are	now	regarded	as	‘irrational’,	so	to	use	it	as	a	standard	of	rationality	we	would	already	have	to	know	how	to	separate	the	good	from	the	bad;	(3)	science	is	not	the	only	institution	that	has	results,	reaches	its	aims,	and	has	a	certain	amount	of	coherence;	and	(4)	facts,	traditions	and	institutions	may	be	rational	in	conforming	to	their	own	standards,	but	cannot	give	us	the	values	and	standards	we	should	strive	for.75	A	standard	argument	of	rationalists	is	that	relativism	(or	pluralism)	opens	the	door	to	chaos	and	arbitrariness;	however,	this	opinion	is	elegantly	combatted	by	the	notion	that	every	major	scientific	revolution	has	been	informed	by	facts,	concepts,	and	notions	that	go	against	all	prior	accepted	forms	of	knowledge.76	In	the	special	cases	of	science,	when	it	happens	to	answer	a	question	we	did	not	even	know	to	ask	(how	some	of	the	most	
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their	families,	Hine’s	images	revealed	the	shifting	reality	of	lower	class	employment	aided	by	disrupting,	and	often	concealed,	technologies.			 Producers	of	ideological	documentary	are	admittedly	biased	toward	their	motive	or	a	cause:	Hine	produced	his	photographs	knowing	what	he	wanted	to	change.	It	functions	today	in	a	very	similar	mode,	motivated	by	a	variety	of	transmitters	whether	moral	activists,	corporations,	intellectuals,	or	fringe	thinkers.	Ideology	functions	similarly	in	photo-journalism	where	images	often	accompany	a	moral	story	that	at	very	least	reflects	the	moral	conscious	of	the	culture	it	exists	within.	Therefore,	a	principal	component	of	ideological	documentary	is	an	author’s	intent;	often	the	photography	itself	offers	no	clear	evidence	of	what	is	inherently	accurate	or	misleading.	What	is	gained	by	the	producer,	in	this	case,	Hine,		in	the	production	of	documentary	images,	is	a	loyalty	(or	perhaps	an	attempt	at	a	realignment)	toward	a	political	position,	whatever	it	may	be.	Hine’s	photographs	showed	the	larger	population	that	conditions	in	factories	were	unjust;	quite	the	opposite	sentiment	that	factory	owners	wished	to	represent.15	The	construction	of	documentary	images	remains	as	lively	as	ever,	with	competing	ideologies	vying	for	legitimacy	and	political	significance.	Galloway	refers	sympathetically	to	this	type	of	image	construction	as	“myth,”	and	unsympathetically	as	“propaganda;”	both	contain	the	ability	to	create	levels	of	facticity	(or	indisputable	realities)	where	none	inherently	exist.16		 As	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	even	institutions	of	science	grapple	with	the	duelling	and	oft-considered	incompatible	notions	of	value	and	objectivity.	As	Heather	Douglas	suggests	in	her	defence	of	value	in	institutions	of	science,	value	is	often	a	necessary	component	of	judging	what	culture	deems	important	enough	to	spend	its	resources	on.17	As	such,	value	is	a	necessary	component	of	informed	decision	making	and	should	not	necessarily	be	considered	a	negative.	It	is	only	when	
                                               
15 For example, many business owners at the time claimed they simply could not afford to operate without 
child labourers, claiming that they were helping idle children out of poverty by working an “honest trade.”	
See: Marjorie E. Wood, Emancipating the Child Laborer: Children, Freedom, and the Moral Boundaries of 
the Market in the United States, 1853‒1938 (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2011), 32. 
16 Galloway, The Interface Effect, 47. 
17 Heather Douglas, “Rejecting the Ideals of Value Free Science,” in Value-Free Science? Ideals and 
Illusions, eds. Harold Kincaid, John Dupre and Alison Wylie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 121-3. 
 40 
the	values	of	the	disenfranchised	are	ignored	in	exchange	for	the	benefit	of	a	few	that	value	judgements	can	be	considered	questionable.	We	might	consider	Hine’s	ideological	documentary	practices	under	this	rubric:	while	his	photographs	primarily	functioned	as	a	form	of	propaganda,	they	also	functioned	as	a	form	of	value-laden	research,	where	the	greater	social	good	was	identified	so	that	cultural	norms	could	be	reformed	via	the	visualization	of	the	disenfranchised.			 Technology,	including	the	photographic	camera,	can	and	is	used	by	many	authors	as	an	apparatus	of	control	and	deception.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	and	observed	in	the	history	of	photography,	the	notion	that	technology	is	a	tool	that	is	politically	neutral	is	inherently	false.	Its	control	and	ownership	offer	many	benefits	to	those	who	use	it	(i.e.	owner/worker;	government/citizen).	Herbert	Marcuse	maintained	that	technology	introduces	problems	that	are	not	an	accident	of	neutrality:			 Scientific-technical	 rationality	 and	 manipulation	 are	 welded	together	into	new	forms	of	social	control.	Can	one	rest	content	with	the	 assumption	 that	 this	 unscientific	 outcome	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	specific	 societal	 application	 of	 science?	 I	 think	 that	 the	 general	direction	in	which	it	came	to	be	applied	was	inherent	in	pure	science	even	where	no	practical	purposes	were	intended,	and	that	the	point	can	 be	 identified	 where	 theoretical	 Reason	 turns	 into	 social	practice.18		Andy	Feenburg	rephrases	this	point	by	asking	what	it	means	when	formal	systems,	such	as	law	or	technology,	are	available	for	applications	biased	to	favour	domination.19	Such	a	question	restates	the	notion	that	there	might	be	something	about	technology	far	beyond	its	physical	construction	that	influences	the	way	it	functions	in	society,	and	which	is	most	likely	found	within	formal	political	systems	such	as	capitalist	democracy.	A	system	that	illustrates	such	a	danger	can	be	found	within	the	“free	press,”	which	is	often	granted	the	status	of	neutrality	and	equal	representation	yet	relies	heavily	on	technical	devices	and	political	entities	to	relay	its	messages.	An	early	analysis	of	the	social	control	of	the	newsroom	by	Warren	
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Breed	outlines	that	owners	of	news	outlets	have	the	“nominal	right	to	set	a	paper’s	policy	and	see	that	all	staff	activities	are	coordinated	so	that	the	policy	is	enforced.”20	While	ethical	journalistic	norms,	individual	staff	opinions,	and	ethical	taboos	regarding	the	formation	of	news	mandates	all	work	against	notions	of	biased	representation,	ultimately,	publishers	also	consider	profit	margins	and	varying	political,	business,	and	labour	interests,	when	setting	mandates.21	According	to	Breed,	social	control	within	the	newsroom	is	a	result	of	staff	members	at	all	levels	conforming	to	policies	via	institutional	authority	and	sanctions,	feelings	of	obligation	and	esteem	for	superiors,	mobility	aspirations,	a	general	absence	of	conflicting	group	allegiance,	the	pleasant	nature	of	the	activity	of	journalism	for	some,	and	the	production	of	news	as	a	value	in	itself.22	Such	a	range	of	political	motivations,	from	policymaker	to	the	individual,	degrades	hypothetical	notions	of	any	unbiased	and	factual	reporting.23		How	useful,	then,	are	the	technological	tools	meant	to	document	and	reveal,	like	the	photographic	camera?	Even	if	a	tool	is	used	to	reform	and	produce	moral	advances	within	a	culture,	its	successes	must	be	measured	against	the	fact	that	those	with	greater	access	to	resources	and	political	control	have	an	equally	potent	tool	at	their	disposal.	This	is	perhaps	the	most	significant	limitation	of	ideological	documentary:	that	it	must	have	a	standpoint	implies	that	bias	is	necessarily	a	part	of	its	production,	making	its	supposed	neutrality	suspect	by	its	very	nature.	Because	these	notions	are	not	implicit	in	any	document	produced	by	or	of	technology,	it	is	not	possible	to	distinguish	any	discernible	facticity	about	what	is	being	depicted,	without	scrutinizing	the	images	in	question	with	regards	to	contextual,	political	and	aesthetic	motivations	of	its	author(s).	This	reading	of	ideological	documentary	production,	however,	becomes	somewhat	less	decipherable	in	the	hands	of	a	seemingly	independent	and	at	least	
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inherently	anti-aesthetic:	too	hidden	to	be	able	to	conform	to	aesthetics	of	coherence	and	resistant	to	vision	altogether.		However,	the	revelatory	power	of	documentary	still	has	a	place	in	a	culture	that	continues	to	be	transformed	by	technology	in	ways	that	remain	relatively	hidden	to	most	consumers.	The	images	of	ideological	documentary,	however,	are	usually	borne	a	posteriori,	or,	after	the	destruction	of,	say,	the	landscape	or	the	enactment	of	deplorable	child	labour	practices.27	Images	such	as	these	are	particularly	suited	to	rendering	(or	envisioning)	the	accumulation	of	the	past,	but	less	potent	in	signalling	potential	ramifications	in	the	present	and	future,	which	of	course,	would	be	more	useful	in	our	evaluation	of	the	impact	of	emerging	technologies.	For	example,	fossil	fuels	were	identified	for	their	potential	to	cause	global	warming	by	John	Tyndal	in	1860.	Today,	however,	even	proof	offered	by	scientists	and	image-makers	does	little	to	sway	opinion	on	the	damaging	effects	of	fossil	fuels	for	those	who	do	not	agree.	Was	there	anything	photography	could	have	done	to	help	us	understand	such	a	phenomenon	more	broadly?		As	a	timely	example	of	the	challenges	and	weaknesses	of	ideological	documentary	in	the	contemporary	social	climate,	we	may	look	to	the	very	recent	photographs	depicting	Donald	Trump’s	inauguration.	Public	disagreement	over	the	number	of	people	present	was	provoked	by	questioning	the	legitimacy	of	news	organizations,	rather	than	through	an	analysis	of	our	best	sources	of	objective	facticity	(in	this	case	photographs).28	If	notions	of	facticity	can	be	dictated	by	someone	with	power	and	a	particular	political	motivation	by	merely	referring	to	photographs	as	fake	news,	what	role	can	ideological	documentary	have	in	a	“post-
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portrayed	in	popular	culture,	and	his	work	won	little	acceptance	outside	of	the	art	world	until	much	later.37			 The	mechanical	qualities	of	the	camera	acquired	supreme	importance	after	the	Pictorial	movement	of	the	early	1900’s.	As	early	as	1916,	critics	such	as	Sadakichi	Hartmann	advocated	for	“straight”	photography	that	did	not	“overstep	the	boundaries	and	deliberately	mix	up	photography	with	the	technical	devices	of	painting	and	the	graphic	arts,”	asking,	“[w]hy	then	should	not	a	photographic	print	look	like	a	photographic	print?”38	Exploitation	of	the	camera’s	ability	to	generate	extremely	lucid,	carefully	composed,	and	aesthetically	concentrated	images	remained	the	principle	way	in	which	documentary	photographs	were	presented	into	the	1930’s	when	the	term	documentary	first	came	into	wide	usage.39	Photographers	such	as	Walker	Evan,	Eugène	Atget,	and	August	Sander	were	celebrated	for	their	ability	to	represent,	with	uncanny	detail	and	supposed	realism,	everyday	life.	The	notion	that	the	photograph	required	flourishes	of	artistry,	such	as	an	exaggerated	depth	of	field	and	simulated	colour	to	be	accepted	as	art	was	exchanged	for	the	idea	that	photographs	were	most	useful	when	they	adhered	to	their	strength—their	supposed	ability	to	represent	with	mechanical	precision	and	technical	efficiency	while	maintaining	a	singular	and	individual	voice.40	This	sentiment	was	partially	shaped	at	the	time	by	Clement	Greenberg,	who	despised	the	notion	that	the	photographer	had	to	simulate	other	forms	of	accepted	art	practice:		 If	one	wants	to	see	modern	art	photography	at	its	best	let	him	look	at	the	work	of	Walker	Evans,	whose	photographs	have	not	one-half	the	physical	finish	of	[Edward]	Weston’s.	Evans	is	an	artist	above	all	because	 of	 his	 original	 grasp	 of	 the	 anecdote.	 He	 knows	 modern	painting	 as	 well	 as	 Weston	 does,	 but	 he	 also	 knows	 modern	literature.	And	in	more	than	one	way	photography	is	closer	today	to	literature	 than	 it	 is	 to	 the	 other	 graphic	 arts.	 (It	 would	 be	illuminating,	perhaps,	to	draw	a	parallel	between	photography	and	
                                               
37 Howard S. Becker, "Photography and Sociology," Studies in Visual Communication 1, no. 1 (1974), 9. 
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40 For an in-depth historical analysis of this moment, see Christopher Phillips, "The Judgment Seat of 
Photography," October 22 (1982): 27-63. 
 52 
prose	in	their	respective	historical	and	aesthetic	relations	to	painting	and	poetry.)	The	final	moral	is:	let	photography	be	“literary.”41		Greenberg	understood	the	“art”	in	photography	to	be	different	from	all	other	art	forms,	unlike	the	photographs	produced	by	Edward	Weston,	which	Greenberg	described	as	“arty”	rather	than	art	that	took	advantage	of	the	camera’s	specific	capacities.42	This	notion	ran	counter	to	Surrealist	approaches	at	the	time	of	artists	such	as	Man	Ray	and	Brassaï,	who	used	photography	to	speak	about	the	Freudian	unconscious	in	works	that	often	consisted	of	gross	distortions	and	material	explorations.	While	many	surrealists	used	strategies	such	a	double	exposure,	combination	printing,	montage	and	solarization	to	evoke	the	union	of	dream	and	reality,	several	less	material	strategies	were	also	employed.	For	example,	Jacques-André	Boiffard	often	photographed	close-ups	of	isolated	bodily	fragments	such	as	the	toe,	the	head	and	the	mouth,	as	they	emerged	from	darkness,	creating	a	very	life-like	yet	abstracted	and	oversized	example	of	the	human	body.	Boiffard,	in	the	preface	of	La	Révolution	surrealist,	referred	to	such	images	as	“surrealist	facts,”	stating	the	“[e]very	discovery	that	changes	the	nature,	the	destination	of	an	object	or	of	a	phenomenon	constitutes	a	surrealist	fact.”43	Rosalind	Krauss	identified	the	power	of	surrealist	photography	to	“preserve	the	seamless	surface	of	the	final	print	and	thus	re-enforce	the	sense	that	[an]	image,	being	a	photograph,	documents	the	reality	from	which	it	is	a	transfer,”	referring	to	the	“facticity”	of	the	photography,	or	its	privileged	relation	to	the	real.44	This	relationship	between	surrealism	and	photography	is	often	considered	tenuous,	however,	with	many	surrealist	works	frequently	missing	the	mark,	as	Teju	Cole	describes:	“what	is	lost	is	inadvertency	and	the	element	of	surprise	—	the	sense	that	the	power	of	the	image	is	independent	
                                               
41 Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 2: Arrogant Purpose, 1945-1949, ed. 
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42 Ibid., 61-64. 
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of	the	photographer’s	plans.”45	This	is	precisely	why	the	photographs	of	Eugène	Atget,	a	photographer	documenting	the	empty	streets	of	Paris	as	if	they	were	an	elaborate	still-life	set,	were	heralded	by	surrealists	such	as	Man	Ray	(and	even	used	on	the	cover	of	La	Révolution	Surréalist).	As	it	happens,	many	of	the	most	successful	surrealist	photographs	ended	up	being	what	we	might	call	“straight	photographs”	today.	Indeed,	many	artists	and	enthusiasts	eventually	rallied	around	the	notion	that	the	content	and	subject	matter	of	photographs	were	where	the	freedom	and	expression	of	photography	was	most	valuable,	and	agreed	upon	general	notions	of	aesthetic	coherence:	sharp,	well	composed,	and	technically	proficient	photographs	made	the	best	use	of	the	camera	as	an	instrument	of	representation.	In	terms	of	documentary	photography,	this	particular	style	has	endured	and	will	be	discussed	further	in	the	following	section.			 Frank’s	blunt	departure	from	the	conventions	of	the	above	modernist	photography	ingeniously	aligned	the	technical	use	of	the	camera	to	the	subject	matter	he	was	attempting	to	represent.46	His	blurry,	shaky,	and	(initially-considered)	poorly	composed	images	introduced	a	different	form	of	a	documentary	image	that	concerned	itself	less	with	aesthetic	convention	or	surface	representation,	and	more	with	a	desire	to	reveal	an	America	that	defied	then-current	public	perceptions	(both	insider	and	outsider).	America	was	not	a	highly	polished	society	without	problems	and	ugliness,	and	Frank	embraced	the	falsity	of	such	framings.	By	using	a	technique	that	was	aesthetically	jarring,	he	revealed	a	grittier	picture	of	American	life,	remarkable	for	how	it	destabilized	the	myth	of	a	problem-free	America	using	the	same	propaganda	tool	as	capitalist	and	political	enterprises	used:	the	power	of	the	photograph	to	construct	an	image.	By	subverting	common	tactics,	Frank	constructed	an	opposing	force	that	denied	dominant	hegemonies	articulated	using	a	singular	voice.	While	The	Americans	has	traditionally	been	viewed	through	
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Ruff’s	images	in	the	gallery,	the	less	legible	they	become,	which	runs	counter	to	the	intuitive	mode	of	visual	examination.	Within	the	bookwork	produced	under	the	same	title,	we	are	introduced	to	pleasant	and	neutral	images	first,	but	as	the	viewer	progresses	through	the	book,	Ruff’s	subject	matter	gets	noticeably	more	morose.	Such	sequencing	may	allude	to	the	potential	negative	ramifications	of	trading	high-resolution	and	tangible	physical	objects	for	the	increasingly	intangible	and	fleeting	digital	image.	There	are	many	possible	readings	of	Ruff’s	work,	but	it	is	ultimately	underpinned	by	a	desire	to	expand	the	visual	language	of	photography	and	introduce	incoherent	aesthetic	forms	into	a	politics	of	broadening,	rather	than	limiting,	our	understanding	of	images	and	the	usefulness	of	the	artist’s	camera.			 Thomas	Ruff	studied	under	the	highly	influential	photographers	Bernd	and	Hilla	Becher	during	the	conceptual	art	boom	of	the	1970s.	The	Bechers’	photographs	document	the	highly	aesthetic	forms	of	rural	farming	structures,	developing	a	distinct	link	between	the	form	and	function	of	their	subject.	Their	subtle	approach	to	photographing	their	subject	matter—including	water	towers,	grain	elevators,	and	framework	houses—emphasizes	the	individuality	of	each	structure	through	a	disciplined	and	methodological	approach,	such	as	only	photographing	on	overcast	days	and	from	a	repetitive	profile	perspective.	The	resulting	photographs	are	then	presented	via	“typologies,”	displaying	similar	structures	in	a	grid	format.	What	the	Bechers	accomplished,	amongst	other	things,	could	be	considered	the	visualization	of	a	turning	point	within	the	capacity	of	the	photographic	camera	to	record	elements	of	technology	directly.	In	this	case,	the	Bechers’	images	depict	industrial	architecture	that	bears	the	visual	cues	of	their	functions,	but	doing	so	becomes	more	difficult	as	structures	shift	towards	uniformity	and	a	generic	appearance.54	In	their	capture	of	forms	that	visualize	function,	and	vice	versa,	and	in	their	capture	of	humanity	and	individuality	within	industrial	architecture,	which	is	quickly	fading,	the	Bechers	
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Struth	produced.60	Having	spent	many	years	in	the	confines	of	the	research	station	in	Madre	de	Dios,	Peru,	Pitman	first	regarded	Struth’s	images	as	of	nothing,	or	rather	of	little	interest,	as	they	contained	no	identifying	markers	or	particular	appeal	from	a	conventional	scientific—or	even	photographic—perspective.	There	were	no	photographs	of	jaguars	or	unique	encounters	with	nature	of	the	type	researchers	like	Pitman	expected	and	were	likely	to	be	shared	at	the	station	and	amongst	colleagues.	Further,	Pitman	recalled	asking	Struth	what	he	was	searching	for	in	order	to	help	him	locate	it	more	efficiently,	to	which	the	only	clear	answer	Struth	gave	was	“complexity.”61		It	was	not	until	after	further	reflection	and	analysis	that	Pitman	came	to	view	Struth’s	photographs	as	possibly	the	most	representative	images	of	the	jungle	he	had	ever	seen,	not	because	they	aimed	to	identify	landmarks	or	recognizable	subjects	within	the	frame,	but	because	they	had	a	quality	that	seemed	to	represent	the	complex	and	interconnected	whole	greater	than	any	single	directed	image	might.	Pitman	explained	that	no	picture	could	represent	all	that	is	the	jungle,	or	the	experience	of	being	there	as	a	matter	of	fact,	but	that	an	image	that	seems	to	evoke	an	awareness	of	unrepresentability	can	sometimes	be	the	most	faithful	in	its	representations.	As	Martin	Rees,	a	cosmologist	that	has	published	over	500	papers	regarding	cosmic	phenomenon	describes,	we	“can	convincingly	interpret	measurements	that	reveal	two	black	holes	crashing	together	more	than	a	billion	light-years	from	Earth.	Meanwhile,	we’ve	made	little	progress	in	treating	the	common	cold,	despite	great	leaps	forward	in	epidemiology.”62	The	idea	that	we	can	think	we	know	concepts	as	arcane	and	remote	as	cosmic	phenomena,	and	be	perplexed	by	the	complexity	of	everyday	things,	isn’t	really	as	paradoxical	as	it	seems.	Reed	continues:	“[a]stronomy	is	far	simpler	than	the	biological	and	human	sciences.	Black	holes,	although	they	seem	exotic	to	us,	are	among	the	uncomplicated	
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of	a	“fetish	of	doom”	and	“a	key	to	happiness.”64	According	to	Benjamin,	the	primary	social	function	of	art	was	(and	arguably	still	is)	to	rehearse	such	interplays	and	unknowables,	though,	he	was	somewhat	skeptical	of	the	photographs	ability	to	alone	puncture	reality,	quoting	Brecht	here:		 As	Brecht	says:	“the	situation	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	less	than	ever	does	the	mere	reflection	of	reality	reveal	anything	about	reality.	A	photograph	of	 the	Krupp	works	or	A.E.G	tells	us	next	 to	nothing	about	 these	 institutions.	 Actual	 reality	 has	 slipped	 into	 the	functional...Something	must	in	fact	be	built	up,	something	artificial,	posed.”65		Photographs	singularly	can	offer	little	more	than	a	descriptive	function	that	can	slip	into	what	Benjamin	calls	“modish”-ness,	or,	the	propensity	of	photographs	to	“transfigure”	the	surface	world	into	the	“beautiful.”66	In	this	respect,	Benjamin	proposes	the	“caption”	as	a	form	of	extending	the	meaning	of	the	photographic	document	that	“will	rescue	it	from	the	ravages	of	modishness	and	confer	upon	it	a	revolutionary	use	value.”67	The	caption	that	Benjamin	suggests	is	to	be	interpreted	rather	than	taken	as	literal,	as	when	he	quotes	Brecht’s	notion	of	“functional	transformation”	(Umfunktionierung),	he	is	referring	to	captions	as	but	one	possibility	in	the	continuous	transformation	of	the	apparatus	towards	wrestling	its	control	from	the	hands	of	mass	production.68	Within	contemporary	documentary	photography,	this	may	refer	to	any	experimental	practice	which	distances	itself	from	conventional	and	capitalist	functions	of	the	photograph.		By	incohering	the	politics	of	images,	and	particularly	sequences	and	collections	of	images,	poetic	documents	seek	instead	to	re-open	the	interpretive	element	of	photography	in	such	a	way	that	avoids	the	singular	reading	of	photography	that	Benjamin	rejects.	
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project,	The	Disappearance	of	Darkness,	took	Burley	across	Canada,	Europe,	and	the	United	States	in	search	of	signs	of	this	demise	in	the	form	of	facility	closures	and	factory	demolitions.	Factories	that	had	been	in	operation	since	the	beginning	of	the	mass	production	of	film	were	closing	at	an	alarming	rate.	Photographic	film	was	becoming	redundant,	its	function	usurped	by	the	efficiency	and	popularity	of	the	digital	sensor.	Burley	offers	a	reading	of	this	moment:			 The	act	of	dissolving	blocks	of	silver	into	nitric	acid,	mixing	it	with	the	tissue	of	animals	and	coating	it	onto	film	and	paper—all	so	the	world	 could	 partake	 in	 one	 of	 the	 world's	 most	 fascinating	 and	important	inventions—was	coming	to	a	rapid	halt.70		Photographic	film	as	we	know	it	has	been	around	for	over	150	years,	but	its	near	disappearance	has	taken	a	fraction	of	this	time.	Burley's	fascination	with	this	demise	was	spurred	by	his	reliance	on	these	traditional	materials	over	his	photographic	career,	and	inevitable	questions	regarding	what	would	happen	next.	Within	his	body	of	work,	we	find	images	of	demolition,	abandoned	buildings,	and	stripped	interiors.	Implosions	of	Buildings	65	and	69,	Kodak	Park,	Rochester,	New	
York	[#2]	(2007)	remains	perhaps	the	most	iconic	of	them	all	[Plate	13].	For	this	photograph,	Burley	directed	his	camera	at	the	cameras	of	the	media	there	to	capture	the	last	moments	of	the	historic	Kodak	building.	The	photograph	is	lit	by	an	eerie	glow,	as	dust	and	debris	make	taking	any	kind	of	photograph	of	the	building's	implosion	impossible.	In	its	final	moments,	the	Kodak	building	escaped	any	form	of	representation;	its	debris	created	a	great	blinding	veil	that	illuminated	a	moment	of	transition	and	unknowability.71			
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conundrum	remains	the	trap	of	photography	that	unceasingly	vexes	the	viewer,	even	those	sophisticated	enough	to	be	fully	aware	of	the	role	that	context	and	interface	play	in	documentary	images.	Reality	often	is	stranger	than	fiction,	so	expecting	viewers	to	understand	what	is	left	out	of	a	photographic	frame	becomes	a	near	impossibility.								Trinh	Minh-Ha	tackles	the	notion	of	facticity	in	documentary	production	as	representative	of	a	history	of	dominance	in	depictions	of	various	positions	of	power	in	society,	arguing	that	“meaning	should	be	prevented	from	coming	to	closure	at	either	what	is	said	or	what	is	shown…[w]hat	is	put	forth	as	truth	is	often	nothing	more	than	a	meaning.”78	Carl	Plantinga	tackles	documentary	from	a	similar	perspective,	convincingly	relaying	the	notion	that	documentary	“intends	that	the	audience	come	to	form	certain	beliefs	[and]	implicitly	assert	something	about	the	use	of	the	medium	itself.”79	He	refers	to	documentary	production	as	offering	an	“audiovisual	array”	that	communicates	some	phenomenological	aspect	of	the	subject,	from	which	the	spectator	might	reasonably	be	expected	to	form	a	sense	of	that	phenomenology,	and/or	form	beliefs	about	the	subject	that	is	being	put	forth.80	In	this	regard,	we	can	imagine	a	purpose	that	is	similar	to	poiēsis,	but	which	also	has	the	potential	to	shatter	our	sense	of	aesthetic	certainty.	In	photography,	creative	applications	of	the	camera	might	put	forth	a	special	meaning,	in	that	such	documents	can	share	new	knowledge	of	the	world,	but	also	question	that	knowledge	(or	lack	thereof)	with	veracity.	This	is	where	photography	has	always	had	utility,	and,	as	I	will	argue,	will	become	even	more	useful	still.			 In	this	final	section,	I	expand	on	the	notion	that	documentary—apart	from	a	desire	to	relay	phenomenological	aspects	(or	some	sense	of	direct	experience)	upon	its	viewer—inherently	asserts	a	difficult-to-describe	something	about	the	culture	it	exists	in	and	the	media	that	it	is	relayed	upon.	If	one	were	asked	to	imagine	a	complex	term	such	as	the	Internet,	a	likely	visual	stereotype	of	server	rooms	or	
                                               
78 Trinh T. Minh-Ha, "Documentary Is/Not a Name" October 52 (1990): 76. 
79 Carl Plantinga, "What a Documentary Is, After All," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63, no. 2 
(2005): 112.  




	 I	 prepare	 certain	 things	 carefully	 because	 I	 believe	 that’s	 what’s	required.	Other	things	are	completely	left	to	chance.	Anything	that	is	prepared,	 constructed,	 or	 organized	 is	 done	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 the	unpredictable	“something”	to	appear	and,	in	appearing,	to	create	the	real	 beauty	 of	 the	 picture,	 any	 picture	 […]	 I	 use	 the	 term	 “neo-realism”	in	the	sense	the	Italian	filmmakers	of	the	1940s	and	after	used	it.	It	refers	to	using	non-professional	performers	in	roles	very	close	to	their	own	lives,	photographing	events	as	if	you	were	doing	reportage,	and	recognizing	good	subjects	in	the	everyday.81		The	idea	of	using	non-professional	performers,	chance,	and	unpredictability	aligns	with	notions	that	Wall	references	in	his	practice,	and	distinguishes	his	work	from	a	more	rigid	documentary	mode	of	production.	While	his	meticulously	crafted	images	may	be	more	constructed	than	other	types	of	documentary	photographs,	the	point	at	which	a	photographic	image	crosses	into	pure	fiction	and	construction	is	difficult	to	identify	and	remains	an	intriguing	issue	in	and	of	itself.	This	question	will	be	explored	further	below.	The	way	photographs	share	an	indexical	relationship	to	their	subjects	is	an	essential	element	of	their	representational	prowess.	In	Picture	
for	Women,	Wall	presents	us	with	an	up-to-date	response	to	Manet’s	1882	painting	
Un	bar	aux	Folies	Bergère,	exchanging	the	male	gaze	for	that	of	the	camera	within	a	more	contemporary	context:		 In	Manet's	 painting,	 a	 barmaid	 gazes	 out	 of	 frame,	 observed	 by	 a	shadowy	male	figure.	The	whole	scene	appears	to	be	reflected	in	the	mirror	behind	the	bar,	creating	a	complex	web	of	viewpoints.	Wall	borrows	the	internal	structure	of	the	painting,	and	motifs	such	as	the	light	 bulbs	 that	 give	 it	 spatial	 depth.	 The	 figures	 are	 similarly	reflected	 in	 a	mirror,	 and	 the	woman	 has	 the	 absorbed	 gaze	 and	posture	 of	 Manet's	 barmaid,	 while	 the	 man	 is	 the	 artist	 himself.	Though	issues	of	the	male	gaze,	particularly	the	power	relationship	between	 male	 artist	 and	 female	 model,	 and	 the	 viewer's	 role	 as	onlooker,	are	implicit	in	Manet's	painting,	Wall	updates	the	theme	by	positioning	the	camera	at	the	centre	of	the	work,	so	that	it	captures	
                                               
81 Jan Estep, "Picture Making Meaning: An Interview with Jeff Wall," Bridge Online 2 (2003), web, accessed 




                                               
82 Gallery Guide text for the exhibition Jeff Wall Photographs, 1978–2004, Tate Modern, London, 21 
October 2005 to 8 January 2006, quoted in David Campany, "'A Theoretical Diagram in an Empty 
Classroom': Jeff Wall's Picture for Women," Oxford Art Journal 20, no. 1 (2007): 12–14. 
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fixed,	and	its	materiality	and	construction	are	also	examined,	the	photograph	is	seen	to	function	entirely	independent	of	such	conventional	modes.			 One	of	the	most	engaging	artists	to	use	a	related	form	of	documentary,	especially	in	technological	representations,	is	the	American-Canadian	artist	Lynne	Cohen	(1944-2014).	Cohen’s	practice	involved	photographing	human-less	spaces	filled	with	the	remnants	of	often-indecipherable	technologies.	Her	images	depict	humanity	through	representations	of	interior	spaces	and	collected	objects,	rather	than	human	occupation,	and	evoke	a	sense	of	human	presence	through	this	absence.	Paul	Butler,	discussing	a	survey	exhibition	of	Cohen’s	work	at	the	Winnipeg	Art	Gallery	with	Peter	Zinojic	explains:		 The	photographs	are	almost	portraits	of	 the	people	who	arranged	these	spaces,	but	without	 the	person.	They	 look	staged,	 like	movie	sets….	For	me,	her	work	has	that	extra	element	you	can’t	really	put	your	finger	on.	It’s	like	a	battle	between	the	two	sides	of	your	brain,	where	you	look	at	it	and	say:	‘well	it’s	just	a	photo	of	a	space,’	but	it’s	not,	there’s	more	to	it.	And	that’s	what’s	interesting,	what	her	work	draws	out	of	the	viewer,	what	it	triggers,	the	places	it	brings	them	to.83		Further,	a	lack	of	descriptive	titles	or	text	forces	viewers	to	consider	images	that	have	been	torn	from	their	historical	and	contextual	surroundings	before	coming	to	any	definitive	conclusions	about	them.		Cohen’s	photographs	take	the	real	as	a	starting	point—they	show	real	places	that	exist	within	the	world—and	allow	for	the	imagined,	constructed,	and	documentary	aspects	of	the	image	to	collide.	Stripped	of	the	narrative	conventions	that	many	documentary	works	rely	on,	her	photographs	have	no	beginning	or	end,	nor	proper	order.84	They	simply	inspire	a	questioning	of	what	the	spaces,	objects,	and	technologies	within	the	images	might	be	for,	and	
                                               
83 Peter Zimonjic, “Found Places: The Photography of Lynn Cohen,” National Gallery of Canada, April 11, 
2014, accessed March 24, 2018.  https://www.gallery.ca/magazine/exhibitions/found-places-the-
photography-of-lynne-cohen. 
84 Cohen discusses the narratives of her work by referring to individual photographs as: “pieces of a 
narrative puzzle that could be about anything. It’s totally absurd. Absurd, but it does tell a story. So the 
work goes back and forth; it is narrative and it isn’t.” See: Bryne McLaughlin, "Lynne Cohen: Space 
Invader," Canadian Art, June 2, 2011, accessed March 25, 2018, 
https://canadianart.ca/features/lynne_cohen/. 
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compel	viewers	to	produce	meaning	via	their	relationships	with	the	depicted	forms.	In	an	interview	with	Bryne	McLaughlin	of	Canadian	Art,	Cohen	expands	upon	her	practice:			 In	fact	my	images	are	mostly	found.	I	don’t	do	any	staging.	But	if	you	set	 one	 picture	 against	 another,	 it	 can	 register	 a	 totally	 different	temperature.	 I	 love	 that.	 I	 talk	 about	 pictures	 contaminating	 each	other.	I	love	the	idea	of	infiltration	and	contamination	in	the	way	that	you	 end	 up	 somewhere	 that	 you	 never	 intended	 to	 be.	 And	 who	would	have	known	anyway?85		The	framing	techniques	used	to	capture	Cohen’s	subjects,	and	the	unlikely	relationships	produced	through	their	combination,	purposely	confuse	them.	The	details	left	both	inside	and	outside	the	frame	defy	normal	documentary	convention	(or	the	desire	to	present	a	complete	picture	of	a	subject),	and	rather	emphasize	a	peculiarity	that	is	often	hidden	in	our	ordinary	experience	of	inside	spaces.	Further,	through	the	careful	composition	of	the	objects	she	renders	within	the	frame,	Cohen	attempts	to	make	the	viewer	“physically	unstable,”	to	“affect	him	or	her	psychologically	as	well.”86	Finally,	we	cannot	know	for	certain,	as	viewers,	whether	the	artist	has	constructed	the	scenes	or	tampered	with	them	in	any	way,	even	after	being	told	by	the	artist	that	she	has	not.	This	uncanny	ambiguity	produces	a	reading	that	requires	interpretation	and	contemplation,	leaving	no	space	for	assurances	or	consummations.	
	
	

































host	of	unforeseen	relationships.	In	this	way,	it	is	useful	to	consider	Cohen’s	approach	as	near	to	documentary	traditions,	but	novel	in	its	blatant	visual	intervention	and	omission.	It	is	fair	to	consider,	given	the	lack	of	context,	that	Cohen’s	motivations	were	at	least	in	part	to	offer	a	broadening	rather	than	a	limiting	of	our	collective	definitions	of	common	spaces	such	as	laboratories	and	spas,	and	how	they	are	assumed	to	look.	The	artist’s	sparse	use	of	descriptive	titling	and	an	unwillingness	to	locate	specific	spaces	often	means	that	several	photographs	either	have	the	same	title	or	go	untitled,	thus	furthering	the	notion	that	Cohen	desires	to	mystify	our	visual	field.		Moving	slightly	away	from	Near	Documentary,	another	distinct	example	of	a	novel	approach	towards	documentary	practice	exists	within	the	digitally	manipulated	work	of	Andreas	Gursky,	where	the	potentials	of	digital	imaging	technology	are	referenced	in	tandem	with	a	variety	of	techno-globalized	subject	matter.	Caitlin	Zaloom	describes	one	of	Gursky’s	iconic	images	of	a	stock	market	trading	floor:		 A	 photograph	 of	 the	 Chicago	Board	 of	 Trade	 hangs	 in	 a	 crowded,	central	passageway	of	London’s	Tate	Modern	gallery.	Every	inch	of	its	six-foot	length	vibrates	with	financial	frenzy	and	spins	with	the	disorder	of	 time	and	space.	The	picture	 induces	 the	vertigo	of	 the	contemporary	world,	and	the	frame	spills	over	with	traders,	clerks,	brokers,	 computer	 terminals,	 and	 telephones.	 The	 acid	 colors	 of	trading	coats	whirl	in	and	around	the	dealing	pits.	Hands	and	faces	blur	as	they	work	to	buy	and	sell	financial	commodities.	The	motion	is	not	all	in	the	present,	though.	Andreas	Gursky,	the	artist,	digitally	layered	the	 image	to	show	traders	who	were	once	there	and	have	now	gone.	Trading	cards,	bits	of	newspaper,	and	financial	statements	shine	 through	 spectral	 bodies.	 The	 camera	 can	 record	 only	 their	traces	as	they	hurtle	headlong	into	the	future.	Just	as	past,	present	and	 future	 blur	 together,	 space	 is	 also	 unstable.	 The	 trading	 area	collapses	inward	as	the	plane	of	the	floor	tilts	forward	into	the	frame.	The	composition	lacks	a	distinct	center.	The	viewer	is	off	balance—neither	directly	nor	hanging	above	it.87			
                                               
87 Caitlin Zaloom, Out of the Pits: Traders and Technology from Chicago to London (Chicago: University of 












                                               
88 Hanako Murata, “Material Forms in Nature: The Photographs of Karl Blossfeldt,” in Object: Photo. 
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	 Fontcuberta’s	work	can	best	be	described	as	lying	on	the	prospective	boundary	of	documentary	representation	and	fiction.	Through	his	use	of	film	stock,	photography,	the	camera,	and	other	scientific	tools	of	representation,	he	effectively	calls	into	question	the	representational	capacity	of	our	current	technologies,	and	asks	us	to	rethink	our	connections	to	the	visual	world.	Such	a	practice	remains	effective	because	of	its	ties	to	the	documentary	medium	and	the	relationship	it	has	historically	had	with	faithful	representation.	However,	with	invisible	and	non-visual	cultural	phenomena,	the	problems	of	representation	grow	more	confounding.	How	might	we	begin	to	represent	the	invisible	forces	constructing	our	reality?	Fontcuberta’s	strategy	has	been	to	point	out	the	impossibility	of	truly	knowing,	and	to	offer	an	inquisitive	stance	instead.				2.6	 CONCLUSION		 Much	like	Galloway	has	suggested,	the	notion	of	truth	as	defined	by	the	dual	characteristics	of	aesthetic	and	political	incoherence	is	likely	impossible	to	represent	wholly	by	any	single	means.	He	asks	us	to	consider	the	following	while	asking	if	some	things	are	genuinely	unrepresentable:		 Each	photograph	of	violence	is	a	testament	to	the	representability	of	violence,	 not	 its	 unrepresentability.	 So	what	went	wrong	with	 the	analysis?	How	did	it	get	off	track?	At	this	point	it	is	wise	to	return	to	first	principles,	recalling	that	the	constitutive	axis	for	representation	always	has	a	relationship	with	the	mode	of	production,	not	simply	the	 ideological	 conceits	 and	 tricks	 of	 state	 power	 that	 are	 its	epiphenomena….Consider	 the	 logic	 of	 how	 the	 thing	 that	 most	permeates	our	daily	lives	will	be	the	same	thing	that	retreats	from	any	tangible	malleability	in	our	hands	and	minds.	But	what	are	these	things?	We	must	speak	of	the	information	economy.	We	must	simply	describe	today's	mode	of	production	 in	 its	many	divergent	details:	the	diffusion	of	power	into	distributed	networks,	the	increase	in	local	autonomous	decision	making,	the	ongoing	destruction	of	the	social	order	at	the	hands	of	industry,	the	segmentation	and	rationalization	of	minute	gestures	within	daily	life,	the	innovations	around	unpaid	
 97 


































                                               
















                                               
2 Adobe’s summary of the Spot Healing Brush tool: “The Spot Healing Brush tool quickly removes 
blemishes and other imperfections in your photos. The Spot Healing Brush works similarly to the Healing 
Brush: it paints with sampled pixels from an image or pattern and matches the texture, lighting, 
transparency, and shading of the sampled pixels to the pixels being healed. Unlike the Healing Brush, the 
Spot Healing Brush doesn’t require you to specify a sample spot. The Spot Healing Brush automatically 
samples from around the retouched area.” See: "Retouch and Repair Photos," Adobe Help Center, 








                                               
3 To extend this argument further, Michel Callon proposes that interaction and debate between the public 
(non-specialists) and the institution of science are entirely necessary to curtail the growing mistrust of 
specialized tools and processes. According to Callon, such engagements should be “aimed at broadening 
the circle of actors addressing the issue of technoscience and its applications. They replace an 
undifferentiated public consisting of citizens or anonymous consumers by differentiated publics with 
particular and contrasting competencies and points of view.” Michel Callon, "The Role of Lay People in the 





We must simply describe today's mode of production in its many 
divergent details: the diffusion of power into distributed networks, the 
increase in local autonomous decision making, the ongoing destruction 
of the social order at the hands of industry, the segmentation and 
rationalization of minute gestures within daily life, the innovations 
around unpaid micro labor, the monetization of affect and the ‘social 
graph,’ the entrainment of universalizing behaviors within protocological 
organization — these are the things that are unrepresentable.4 	Are	some	things	unrepresentable	even	via	an	instrument	as	powerful	as	the	camera?	How	might	we	attempt	to	visualize	the	critical	and	hidden	elements	of	society?	While	Galloway	refers	to	many	social	phenomena	as	interwoven	and	unrepresentable	within	contemporary	visual	interfaces,	I	argue	that	it	is	counterintuitive	and	even	dangerous	to	cease	all	attempts	at	representing	them.	When	technologies	become	inscrutable,	they	become	harder	to	question	and	analyze.	Rather	than	give	up,	new	strategies	of	using	the	camera-instrument	and	its	visual	representations	must	continuously	be	mined	lest	we	succumb	to	an	even	more	indecipherable,	Baudrillardian	sign-order	relationship.	Another	intriguing	question	arises:	can	we	draw	a	relationship	between	such	complex	social	and	cultural	phenomena	and,	say,	scientific	attempts	at	representing	the	elusive	Higg’s	Boson	particle,	or	the	yet-to-be-discovered	Dark	Matter?	There	is	no	specific	answer	to	this	question,	except	perhaps	in	the	form	of	another	question:	if	scientific	inquiry	does	not	cease	its	attempts	to	represent	such	things	in	the	face	of	a	struggle	with	the	
                                               





                                               
5 Arnold Geulincx, Arnoldi Geulincx ... Saturnalia, Seu (ut Passim Vocantur) Quæstiones Quodlibeticæ in 













                                               
6 I refer to commonplace (or clichéd) images as limited in their capacity to explain complex phenomena 
while remaining representative within culture due to a lack of more fitting images. Such images, like an 
image of a server room meant to visualize the Internet, can act to the detriment of expanding our visual 
field (and our understanding of evolving visual forms). 

















                                               
8 NASA, The National Science Foundation, DARPA, and many other science-based institutions feature blue 
prominently in their logos and disseminations, perhaps due to its links to creativity.  
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Plate 28 – Mark Kasumovic, Painter’s Tape (Synchrotron Experiment), 2016. Considering	the	laboratory	with	regards	to	the	relatively	banal	electronic	components	that	are	so	undecipherable	in	photographs—the	symbolic	nature	of	scientific	instruments	and	inquiry	can	be	made	apparent	via	the	repeated	notion	that	human	knowledge	is	indeed	heavily	codified	and	increasingly	intangible	(dare	I	say,	inhuman).	If	the	primary	tool	we	collectively	rely	on	to	understand	our	visual	world	is	so	inadequate	for	describing	contemporary	visual	reality,	it	sincerely	amplifies	the	Baudrillardian	notion	that	we	are	enveloped	within	a	reality	that	has	little	relationship	with	the	material	forms	that	surround	us.	Indeed,	we	need	to	consider	this	notion	thoroughly	and	repeatedly.	The	only	way	we	can	begin	to	understand	the	symbolic	nature	of	contemporary	reality	is	to	move	beyond	limited	and	traditional	representations	and	put	to	work	the	symbolic	language	that	we	can	(somewhat)	already	understand.	Poetic	and	truthful	photographic	documents	are	armed	with	such	potent	functions.	These	categories	specifically,	via	a	politic	of	incoherence,	can	employ	the	inventive	notions	of	radical	experimentation	towards	novel	interconnections	that	Feyerband	espouses	in	a	visual	way.	Poetic	and	radical	documentary	photographs—again	given	their	political	incoherence—can	further	be	
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used	and	reused	in	varying	contexts	and	forms	to	develop	meaning	in	surprising	and	unanticipated	ways.	9						Much	like	contemporary	technology,	“documentary”	photographs	in	all	of	their	contexts	have	indeed	become	a	necessity.	Try	as	we	might,	it	is	difficult	to	contemplate	a	culture	in	which	we	do	not	rely	on	their	existence	to	bring	meaning	to	the	world.	This	shared	similarity	with	scientific	inquiry	is	instructive	of	the	extent	to	which	we	all	value	the	poiēsis	of	the	human	condition,	the	desire	for	meaning-making	in	all	aspects	of	our	lives.	As	Heidegger	suggests,	the	chain	of	ordering	can	only	be	broken	by	reflecting	on	the	very	tools	used	to	investigate	that	which	we	are	forced	to	question.	The	camera	is	such	a	tool	concerning	the	technology	of	“inquiring”	instruments.	It	is	no	longer	worthwhile	to	question	how	the	camera	is	broken;	how	it	does	not	represent	with	direct	and	full	accuracy.	That	has	become	irrelevant	since	Magritte’s	Treachery	of	Images.	We	know	that	images	are	not	entirely	real,	but	it	is	precisely	because	we	rely	on	them	so	heavily,	and	must	continue	to	employ	them,	that	the	documentary	photograph	remains	so	endlessly	and	utterly	revelatory.															 	
                                               
9 Some of these functions in my own artistic practice have already been explored and can be found within 
the exhibition documentation section of the Appendices, including: ArtLAB Gallery (London, Ontario), The 
Art Gallery of Mississauga (Ontario), Double Happiness Projects (Toronto, Ontario), and the McIntosh 
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Plate 29 – Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt [Front Cover], 2018. 		
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Plate 30 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 1 - A Human Laboratory.”]	
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Plate 31 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 2 - A parade of six megaliths 
mark the position where Sirius, the bright ‘Morning Star,’ would have risen at the spring solstice. Nearby are other 
aligned megaliths and a stone circle, perhaps from somewhat later.”] 
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Plate 32 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 3 - Someone squares the lune, 
a major step toward squaring the circle.”]	
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Plate 33 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 4 - Evidence of astronomical 
calendar stones are found on the Nabta plateau, near the Sudanese border in Egypt. 1”]	
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Plate 34 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018.	
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Plate 35 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 5 - All stars must maintain a 
temperature of at least forty million degrees in order to maintain their fuel supply.”]	
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Plate 36 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 6 - The coincidence of mental 
thoughts with bodily motions is like the conformity between unconnected but synchronized clocks.”]	
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Plate 37 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 7 - Vision is the consequence 
of the formation of an image on the retina by the eye’s lens.2”]
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Plate 38 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018.	
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Plate 39 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 8 - Without consciousness, 
‘matter’ dwells in an undetermined state of probability.”]	
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Plate 40 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 9 - The number of neocortical 




Plate 41 – Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 10 - The shape of the heaven 
is necessarily spherical.3”] 		
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Plate 42 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018.  
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Plate 43 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018.  
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Plate 44 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “The Earth is formed out of debris 
around a solar protoplanetary disk.”]	
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Plate 46 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Oxygen begins to persist in the 
atmosphere in small quantities leading to the Great Oxygenation Event.”]	
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Plate 47 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Organisms replicate their genetic 
material in an efficient and reliable manner.”]	
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Plate 48 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “The sun becomes too hot for life on 
the surface of Earth.”]	
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Plate 49 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Earth’s oceans evaporate.”]
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Plate 50 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “The sun casts out is outer layers, 
expelled by strong solar winds, and transforms into a planetary nebula.”]	
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Plate 52 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. 	
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Plate 53 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 12 - Being must be regarded as 
the ultimate abstraction that can be applied to everything that exists.”]	
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Plate 54 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 13 - Like a hologram, a three-
dimensional volume of space is entirely encoded onto its two-dimensional surface.”] 
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Plate 56 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. 	
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Plate 57 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 15 - The basic stuff of nature is 
water. Wherever there is life, there is moisture.”]	
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Plate 58 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 16 - The elements Fire, Earth, 
Air and Water mix and separate under the guidance of two opposing principles: Love, which draws them together, 
and Strife, which drives them apart.”]	
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Plate 59 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 17 - Animals have memories, 
reason, and other psychological characteristics of man.”]	
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Plate 60 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 18 - A male robin will be more 
diligent in caring for its young if the eggs its mate lays are a brighter shade of blue.”]
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Plate 61 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 19 - Certain physical systems 
can become entangled, meaning that their states are directly related to the state of another somewhere else.”]	
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Plate 62 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 20 - There is no association of 
the particular present with any particular past.”]	
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Plate 63 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 21 - Someone builds a clock 




Plate 64 – Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018.  		
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Plate 65 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 22 - Quantum entangled 
particles can exchange information instantaneously over vast cosmic distances.”] 
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Plate 66 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 23 - Markov chains describe 
sequences of randomly linked probability variables in which the future variable is determined by the present 
variable, but is independent of the way in which the present variable arose from its predecessors.”] 
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Plate 67 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 24 - Proto-Indian writing 
appears in the Indus Valley.7”]	
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Plate 68 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. 	
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Plate 69 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 25 - Rapid Eye Movement 
during sleep is correlated to when dreams are particularly vivid and emotionally charged.”]	
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Plate 70 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 26 - By agitating a bacterial 
culture, mating can be stopped. This permits the manipulation of only a few genes at a time.”]	
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Plate 71 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 27 - Objects have a reality only 
in their relations. All else is imagination.”]	
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Plate 72 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 28 - Being must be regarded as 
the ultimate abstraction that can be applied to everything that exists.”]
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Plate 73 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. [Caption: “Fig. 29 - The implication of being 
incomplete is the need for additional, or hidden, variables.8”]	
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Plate 74 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt, 2018. 	
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Plate 75 - Mark Kasumovic, A Human Laboratory, Book Excerpt [Table of Figures], 2018. 	
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Photographs: 40"x50"; Mural: 8'x8';  
Installation: Particle Experiment (Geneva); Photo Panels I-IV (Sizes: 19”x75” each); 
Microcontrollers; Audio;  






















Satellite Experiment (Chile), Mural and Floating Frame;  
Mural Size: 12'x10'; Frame Size: 19"x70";  
Particle Experiment (Geneva); Photo Panels I-IV (Sizes: 19”x75” each);  












Photographs; Sizes: 40x50 in. each;  
Medium: Inkjet on Canson Infinity Fibre Rag; 

















Two-Channel Video (60 min. loop); Interactive Lighting and Fogger;  
Objects from the UTSIC Collection: Arm Restrainer, Mask for Vision Constriction and 
Rosenzweig Picture Frustration Study;  
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